AMBASSADOR TALKS TO "FRONTLINE"

Interview given by Ambassador James F. Moriarty to Vijay Kumar Pandey on Kantipur TV’s “Frontline” Political Talk Show       
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Vijay: Namaste Excellency!

Ambassador Moriarty: Namasteeeee!

Sanchai hunuhunchha?

Sanchai chha. Tapailai?

Malai thikai chha. How much Nepali you have picked up since you arrived here 20 months back?

Oh, mero Nepali bhasha aghinai dherai bhutte cha thikai chha…. Aaaja ko baithak ma thulo bhag Angreji bhasha ma dinu parcha.

How much politics you have picked up since you came here? Nepali politics?

I am afraid even less. Your politics are very confusing, and we have been constantly straining to understand them.

If we compare the rate of improvement in your Nepali vis-à-vis rate of your understanding about Nepalese politics?

I think, strange as it may seem, my Nepali language is probably better than my understanding of Nepali politics. I will admit that.

You are very much in the news these days. You have become famous.

Yes, that is actually very intentional because even though my understanding of Nepali politics is flawed, I am genuinely very worried, and my government is very worried, that the situation here is getting worse and worse, is deteriorating very quickly.

What do you mean when you say that ‘my understanding of Nepalese politics is very much flawed’? Means what?

Means that I don’t know everything. I would be the first to admit that. This is a country with a long history, a very complicated history, very difficult relationships among many of the key actors. I don’t think any outsider can hope to understand all of those.

When an ambassador of a superpower like America says that his or her understanding about the country is flawed, that’s very, very serious kind of thing.

I think it is, but I mean I believe that everyone should work from a little bit of humility and not assume that they understand everything what’s going on. I think if you push Nepali politicians, if you push His Majesty himself, I think they would all acknowledge that there are gaps in their understandings. One of the biggest gaps that I have been hitting up is of course Maoists’ intentions. I have been stressing that. Well, I obviously cannot look into their hearts. I don’t have contacts with them. I can look at what they say and what they do and come to very worrisome conclusions.

What would be your specific answer to a question about the role of American ambassador in Nepal when it comes to framing overall U.S. policy toward Nepal? How the policy is framed?

Ah, I would say I do play a fairly active role in trying to shape policy back in Washington. Ultimately it is my superiors in the State Department and in the White House who would decide policy towards Nepal, but they will listen to what I have to say.

I am sure they will.

Yes [laughs].
 
I am sure they are. Are they?
 
I think so. Yeah. 

Let’s get back to current politics. Your February 15 remarks at Ganesh Man Singh Prathistan have generated a lot of heat.

As I started off by saying, that was very intentional. If you looked at the developments since the end of the ceasefire you would have to conclude that there are lots of reasons for legitimate concern here. I was trying to bring that concern forward and start a dialogue, start people debating Maoists’ intentions, start people debating the need for reconciliation. I just didn’t want people making assumptions that might prove dangerous to the country later on. I want them examining those assumptions.

When you made those remarks, were you aware that they would generate heat?

Absolutely. A hundred percent sure.

When you made those remarks, were you aware that the heat would be of this scale or this degree?

I believed it would.

Everyday you are in newspaper. And today Mr., among all people, Dr. Bhattarai has also…

Well, I am glad to see Dr. Bhattarai takes what I said seriously and feels compelled to respond. And indeed that is part of what I am trying to do, is to get into a debate about Maoists’ intentions. You know, let them spell out what they mean. For example, if you read these interviews closely and these editorial pieces that Dr. Bhattarai and Mr. Prachanda have given since the end of the ceasefire, if you read them closely, I think you have a lot of cause for concern.
 
When you made those remarks you were very sure that they would generate heat.
 
Yeah.
 
You wanted to make your point straight and loud and clear.
 
And I wanted to generate debate. I wanted people to say to each other: What’s Moriarty saying? Why is he saying that? What is he saying about other people’s intentions? And as long as I get people talking about that, then I think I have accomplished my purpose.

I would like to know whether your opposition to this 12-point understanding between the seven parties and the Maoists is in total? That you don’t agree with anything in that understanding or there are particular clauses that you don’t like?

First of all, I think the biggest concern is how the Maoists have acted since the 12-point understanding. OK. And that played into the one point of particular concern I have when reading the 12-point understanding, which is the very first clause, which says something along the lines that both sides agree to attack the autocratic monarchy from their own positions. And I will tell you that I’ve also had conversations with those people who were in on the negotiations with the Maoists and they made clear to me that the Maoists had initially desired to include a very explicit point saying that they would continue to use violence. And obviously, that first point to me just looked like a compromise. They didn’t specifically say that the Maoists would continue to use violence, but it implied that they would obviously.

My question is, are you against any understanding between Maoists and political parties or you are against particular clauses of that understanding?

I think that the parties have the intention of bringing the Maoists into the mainstream. That’s laudable, that’s good. If it works. If they can come up with an agreement that the Maoists adhere to and do begin coming into the political mainstream, that’s terrific, I would praise that. All I am saying is that this agreement seemed to have left open the option of violence on part of the Maoists. And the Maoists have undeniably engaged in violence. So in other words it seems like the Maoists are telling the world that the 12-point understanding is not about their giving up violence, but the 12-point understand is about their attempting to gain the parties’ support for their use of violence.

U.S. seems to have adopted three attitudes towards this understanding: before, during and after. Say for example, when there were rumors were in the city about Maoists and parties were about to reach to an agreement, you came out against it. You made your mind very clear in the interview given to Kantipur and The Kathmandu Post. But after this understanding became public, the approach America was taking was almost of a cautioned welcome. You were not that much against it. And then one fine morning in February 15, it seems that you have flipped again, or am I reading you wrong?

You are actually spelling out the process from afar very well. Let me fill in a few details. When I came out in October against a prospective agreement, not between parties and the Maoists, but between the UML and the Maoists, I had been told, and have actually been led to believe, that the agreement at that time in no way bound the Maoists to give up violence and in no way bound them to actually even move towards the political mainstream. That was just sort of an agreement to work together against the King. That’s why I spoke out so strongly at that time. That seemed very, very dangerous.
 
When this agreement came out, as I said, I had reservations; my government had reservations. But again, we were willing to look at the clauses that seemed to be a commitment on the part of Maoists try to come to the political mainstream. And yeah, so we were cautious, and we did say that anything that led the Maoists to the mainstream would be welcome. However, since January 2nd, since the end of the ceasefire, it has become increasingly clear with every statement by either Dr. Bhattarai or Mr. Prachanda, along with the increasing drumbeat of violence, that the Maoists didn’t really plan to end violence.

But the blame for that end of ceasefire lies equally with the state because they were not reciprocating?

Yeah, I want to be clear that the ceasefire would be good for Nepal. I do think that there should have been movement on the part of the government towards the ceasefire.

[And] If somebody says that Maoists were pushed towards breaking the ceasefire, they had no other options left?

Are you saying that the only option for the Maoists is violence? In that case, I don’t think parties can work with them.

If somebody that says since the state was not reciprocating Maoist ceasefire, one can’t keep on going on ceasefire on a mono-directional way.

Well, I would think most of the people in the countryside would have hoped that the Maoists had continued their ceasefire. I take your point.  You know, the government should have reciprocated, but frankly Maoists were getting so much credit in the countryside they were beginning to reverse some of the negative feelings towards them. I would argue that it would have helped them to continue with [the ceasefire]. I would hope that it would have made the government more likely to reciprocate eventually.

Are you aware of the background that pushed parties towards Maoists? Once the King was not rolling back to the democratic process.

Absolutely, and I will tell you that we discussed things with Washington, and the day after the takeover by the King last year we were telling Washington, look this is very counterproductive and over time it will push people toward crazy things… push people [to] look at alternatives, violent revolution, and cooperation between parties and the Maoists. Yeah, we understood that.  It was a move that I think has been very counterproductive and has been very dangerous for the country.

In that case, blame for this 12-part understanding, a big share of the blame should go to the king?

Absolutely.

You agree to that?

Yeah, I don’t disagree.

Parties have found themselves to be pushed in that area?

They have been sort of getting boxed into a corner. You know their space has been getting constricted. And to be fair, from both sides. You know, the Maoists have kept or kicked the parties out from the countryside, and they are desperate to get back in. I understand that meanwhile the King was pushing from the other side and not giving the parties other options. So yes. I understand the context.

So in that case can we say parties’ joining hands with Maoists, at least in the context of 12-point agreement, was all but natural consequences of the King’s actions? Largely not all.

Yeah, I am not going to fight you on that Vijay. That’s a reasonable statement, but again I am just looking at the outcome of the 12-point understanding. If it had led to the Maoists genuinely moving towards the mainstream, I’d be here today saying, ‘This is great, and the King has to respond.’ Instead, I am saying they don’t seem to be moving towards mainstream; they seem to be trying to drag the parties into their violent agenda. That’s dangerous. But I’ll still add the King has to be reaching out in trying to reach an understanding with parties.

If you have to give us specific reasons, 1-2-3 why are you against this 12-point understanding?

1-2-3. I would say the murder of candidates and the destruction of candidate’s homes leading up to the municipal elections. The death of a poor young cab driver who broke the Maoist bandh here in Kathmandu. I would say in totality all the statements and pieces spoken and said by Mr. Prachanda and Dr. Bhattarai since the end of the ceasefire. If you take the totality of those statements, the Maoists are saying as clear as can be to anybody who wants to listen that they plan to use violence to overthrow the state. That’s their interpretation of where they stand after the 12-point agreement.

So for you the use of violence in politics is the basic cause of your concern here.

Yeah, very much so. And again the other part that you have to listen to closely is that they are saying that they will use that violence to overthrow the state. They would continue to control weapons after the overthrow of the state. They have a fallback plan. You know if this violent revolution doesn’t work in the next couple of months, they will go back to pushing for a constitutional assembly. And even there they say, OK, during the elections their weapons will be put under some sort of international supervision, not by foreign troops, but some sort of international supervision. But then they will get the weapons back, and they will form the core of the new national army. If anybody thinks that you can have a free and fair election in the villages of Nepal when the villagers think that the Maoists are going to get their weapons back, I think they are being very optimistic.

You don’t want to trust Maoists at all, it seems.

I listen to what they say. I am reading their words very closely. I do have lots of background dealing with communist and totalitarian movements, and if you use that framework to look closely what they say it’s very, very worrisome. Mr. Prachanda has not defined what he means by ‘multiparty system,’ but he has clearly said it’s not ‘bourgeois parliamentary democracy.’ What you and I call democracy is bourgeois parliamentary democracy where people get to vote for their representatives, and the representatives get to decide policies. It’s not a system where you have a few parties under the control of the Maoist party and Maoist party candidates get 99 percent of the vote every time.

Is it possible that you are over-reacting to Maoists not trusting them at all? Not giving them a chance, a fair chance… if somebody says like that?

Sure. You know I started out saying that I don’t know everything here. I hope to God I am wrong in what the Maoists are doing. But I would suggest that it is dangerous for Nepalis to assume that I am wrong and to assume that should ignore everything that Dr. Bhattarai says and Mr. Prachanda says. Well, Mr. Prachanda says that people’s courts will try all feudal elements. What does he mean? You look like a feudal element to me, Vijay.

Yeah… look like one with a tie…

A tie, yeah. You are a class enemy, I think.

Yeah.

I think the people’s court might have to try you when they come to power.

Yeah, yeah. We will see that.

I am not being facetious here. Look closely at what they have said. They’ve given, what, five or six very long interviews each and long pieces. And think about what they are saying very closely. And until they begin defining terms, until they begin defining what their multiparty competition is if it’s not bourgeois parliamentary democracy, until they begin defining what sorts of guarantees there are that they won’t retain their weapons after the election of constituent assembly….

But what the Maoist leadership through direct or indirect sources on occasions are telling ‘bourgeois journalist’ like me is that things will be alright, that we are working for a new democratic system that will bring peaceful, prosperous and more just Nepal. And all of us would have a space in that.

Again, get them to define their terms. And look at what they say closely. That sounds like a bourgeois parliamentary democracy to me, but they are saying it isn’t. So there has got to be some important difference there. They go on to define it. Mr. Prachanda goes on to define it….

Dr. Bhattarai has written an article saying that they have taken a historic decision, they have changed so many of their ideas and they are ready to come to some sort of system, which we can call almost a bourgeois democracy.

He has not said that. No. And he has not repudiated Mr. Prachanda’s insistence that there has to be a constitutional framework that embodies anti-feudalism and anti-imperialism.

I think you want a definition and clarification from Maoists’ front regarding what kind of Nepal they want to create.

That’s my point.
 
Specific and clear.
 
I agree with you entirely. And I hope that you can actually get them to a definition of bourgeois parliamentary democracy. Because anything else, if they sort of caveat it and put all sorts of conditions on it, means they really do have kuniyat, as we say, ‘bad intentions.’

Would you like existing triangular conflict going on forever instead of some bipolar development taking place here?

No. Actually what I would like to see is a unitary state, a functioning democracy where all the players agree that the voters, the people of Nepal, every two years or four years are going to get together and elect their representatives. That’s what we want. We don’t want this triangular division, which is very, very unhealthy and dangerous.

This triangular conflict has been going on for so long, giving us no results. So what’s wrong in trying to convert this thing into a bipolar one?

No. As I have been saying, I think all Nepalese should be trying to convert it into an unipolar agreement, not a conflict at all. I understand what you are saying. The implication is that the parties and the Maoists have to struggle against the palace. And in some ways, I can appreciate that perspective in the sense that the King has pushed the parties away and has made it much more difficult to achieve reconciliation. On the other hand though, as I say, the Maoists continue to make it clear that what they are in for is the violent overthrow of the state, and I think they believe that if the state is overthrown violently they will continue to have control over weapons after that.

You are constantly maintaining a stand that whatever Maoists are saying is their tactics and they will come to their natural selves when they are in power, right? That’s what you are saying.

I am saying listen to what they say closely. I mean, just don’t pick out one or two phrases and say this is their intent. Listen to Prachanda when he says we don’t want bourgeois parliamentary democracy and think about what that means. Listen to him when he says that the next step is for the parties to join an underground government and support the peoples’ army against the state. And think about what that means.

Which is the better option? Parties and Maoists coming to some sort of an understanding [or] this triangular stalemate going on forever and ever.

Those are two options that I don’t accept. I am not supporting either of them. Maybe in theory, if the Maoists do genuinely move towards the political mainstream. Great. I’ll welcome that. Until they begin that movement though, obviously I cannot accept, I can’t endorse, the parties working with the Maoists to achieve the violent overthrow of the state. That’s not a good option. Equally, this triangular conflict is very dangerous for Nepal.

America wants this problem to be solved through force or through dialogue. Or combination?

I want this problem to be solved as quickly as possible. I fear this problem cannot be solved unless there is a coherent counter-insurgency strategy. I will stress that that counter-insurgency strategy mainly has to be: How do the government and the political parties begin winning back the rural areas? How do they make people safe in the rural areas? My Nepali is pretty bad, but it’s not so bad that I can’t talk to people. Everybody I talk to from outside of Kathmandu, whether from the left or from the right, tells me that the people in the village are scared. Every night they go to bed scared. Scared mainly from the Maoists. They don’t know what’s going to happen to them. They don’t know whether somebody is going to for food, somebody will ask for money, or somebody is going to ask for their children. That’s the situation that has to be reversed. A little bit of that is security, but a lot of that is, frankly, getting government services….

What would be your specific answer to the question that whether America wants to solve the problem by dialogue, force, or combination.

Obviously, we want it resolved by dialogue. But I will tell you that I have not seen the condition yet that convinces me that the Maoists -- 10 years into their struggle, seeing a very, very weak government, seeing huge division between the palace and the parties -- are convinced that they need to give up their final goal. And I think Nepalis have to ask themselves: Do the Maoists think they are winning? I say their answer is probably yes. If so, at that point why would they give up their final goals? Their final goal is a one-party state.
 
Maoists appear winning. Will they ever win? Those are two different things. The Maoists leadership occasionally tells us that we will not be able to capture the statecraft, you know.
 
And that gets back to your earlier question -- the never-ending triangular arrangement. I don’t think there can be a never-ending triangular arrangement. Basically I believe that this state is in danger of collapse. I can’t state more clearly than that. If the palace and the parties do not cooperate, if the king doesn’t reach out, if they don’t begin to plan a way back to democracy, the current state of affairs will not last all that long, and I think the most likely result is the collapse of the state and an opportunity for the Maoists to make huge advances.

Many things that you have said are absolutely correct, but you have a hole in your theory.

I hope so.

If it is a triangular conflict, you are prescribing expulsion of one side of the triangle. You are trying to imagine that the side, Maoists side, does not exist. If you are trying to bring peace here through dialogue, you are negating that side’s existence.

No, not at all. What I am saying is that I believe that until and unless you have a coherent way forward on the part of the – [as] I will continue to call them -- the legitimate constitutional forces, the palace and the parties, there will be no need for the Maoists to make serious compromises. That’s all I am saying. I am not saying you shouldn’t talk to them, because again I will go back to my opening statement: I don’t know everything. May be the Maoists really are desperate to come in out of the cold. Their actions and their words suggest that is not the case, but there is no reason not to be talking to the Maoists and trying to find out what their intentions are. But I will tell you that I genuinely believe that until they understand that there is a coherent plan in place that will lead to the gradual erosion to their own position, there is no pressure on them to compromise.

Talking about knowing everything, our Lama tells us in monastery that only in the stage of nirvana or in mathematics that one knows everything. Anybody who says that I know everything is basically a …

So I have not reached nirvana yet.

Yes. I am sure someday.

Yes. I hope so.

Let’s get back to politics. Are you in a dead-end with Maoists or would you like to give them some sort of benefit of doubt or space?

There is always the benefit of the doubt, but again Maoist actions and Maoist words actions will depend on how my country views them at least. And their actions and words have been pretty belligerent since the end of the ceasefire.

Now let’s get back to that famous buzzword, reconciliation, which you have been prescribing and so many others. What do you mean by reconciliation? Reconciliation for what?

Well actually, the reconciliation would have two goals. One would be how the King and the parties map a path back to a real functioning democracy, and the other would be how does the country affectively address the Maoist insurgency. Two very clear goals for reconciliation.

Where do the Maoists fit in the reconciliation?

That’s the second part. How do you deal with the Maoists? There’s all sorts of ways to do it as long as there is consensus. I think it is perfectly reasonable to say, OK, come in here for serious talks, we will even consider putting you in a joint government. There are many possible solutions. But there has to be some sort of agreement between legitimate political forces, because I worry that the Maoists will feel no pressure to compromise otherwise.

Who is legitimate political force and who is not? At the moment, you know it is so…

Well, you can get into a healthy debate. All I am saying is the King and the political parties. I don’t call the Maoists a ‘legitimate’ political force because they are using violence to overthrow the state, and they took up arms against a functioning parliamentary system. So I can’t yet call them a ‘legitimate’ political force. They are undeniably a force that needs to be dealt with, that needs to be recognized, but they are not a legitimate political force.

Is the understanding between King and political parties mandatory for solving Maoist problem and other problems? Peace? Is it an absolute condition?

Again, I am not all-knowing, but I fear that it might be. And I fear that it might be precisely because the Maoists are showing no signs of feeling under pressure to compromise, under pressure to give up their final objectives. And it’s precisely those actions and words that are making me fear that, yes, agreement is necessary between the parties and the palace.

In a situation like now when the King and the parties are not coming together, how this reconciliation can take place? We find ourselves holding in a never-ending triangular conflict. So if these two sides are trying to get some sort of solution, what’s wrong with that? That’s what an average Nepali does not understand in the street.

Oh, there is absolutely nothing wrong with the parties and the Maoists trying to come up with a solution and fighting to get back to bourgeois parliamentary democracy. But again, I would suggest that the Maoists, since the end of the ceasefire, have made it clear that that does not seem to be their goal.
 
After you February 15 remarks, so many people in the press and some political party leaders, they felt kind of sad by your remarks. They thought that at this time when the parties are in kind of a conflict with the King’s direct rule your remarks have weakened the positions of the people who aspire for a democratic Nepal. Do you have any comments on that?
 
This was actually a very serious consideration on my part because I can understand that the parties do believe that working together or having an understanding with the Maoists adds pressure on the King. So I do worry about undercutting their pressure to force the King into compromise. On the other hand, I think the dangers of what the Maoists [doing] are serious enough that there has to be a real debate about their intentions.
 
King’s position has been stronger after your remarks? 

I don’t think so. I think the King understands that he has virtually no international support. I think he understands that the country is in serious straits. And I think he understands, if anything more clearly now, that the working arrangement between the parties and the Maoists is dangerous for him, as well as, I believe, dangerous for the country.

 
Some rightist people inside royal palace were very jubilant after your remarks. They said that look now the Americans are moving away from this democratic camp.  

Well if you look at everything that we’ve said and done not just since February 1 of last year but in the past years, we’ve never stopped saying that we were all about a peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Nepal. We’ve never stopped pointing out to the King that his actions since the February 1 last year are not leading towards [a good] outcome, that he needs to reverse course, that there has to be an agreement between the palace and the parties.

 
If you have to choose between democracy and King’s direct rule, what would you choose?  

Democracy. In a flash.

 
If you have to choose between democracy and peace, what would you choose?  

Between democracy and peace? I think that’s a false choice. I don’t think that is a choice.  … I think the history of the past year has shown that there’s no way that you can have an authoritarian government here that can effectively address the insurgency.

 
In a current state where the democracy cannot stand on its own and neither peace, would you prefer this current stalemate to continue or is it better for the parties to make some sort of a compromise with the Maoists?  

Depends on what the compromise is. If there’s a compromise where over time the Maoists assume effective control of the state through a non-democratic means, then no, I can’t say that that’s a good compromise. If the compromise is one that genuinely ends up with the Maoists giving up their weapons and being just one of several parties freely competing for power in a parliamentary system, as I said earlier, we will welcome that. But it depends on the exact form of the compromise, and the parties have to be careful and they are very aware of that question, too.

 
If you have to choose between totalitarian state of King and totalitarian state of the Maoists.  

I don’t think that the former can stand is all I am saying. And that’s what the last year has shown -- that king cannot hold absolute power in his own hands. And I think he understands that. The constellation of forces would be too much against him, internationally and domestically. He would have no support domestically. He would have no support internationally. And, a totalitarian state of the left would be a complete disaster for Nepal.

 
Would you prefer King’s totalitarian state rather than Maoist totalitarian state?  

I don’t think the King could do it even if he wanted to, is all I am saying. I think the Maoists could do it if everything breaks their way. 

Dr. Baburam Bhattarai says that you are opposing an imaginary Maoist totalitarian state and in that process you are helping King’s totalitarian state. 

Well, again, he should define what his goals are. What is this democracy that is not bourgeois parliamentary democracy? What is this democracy that is anti-feudal and anti-imperialist? Those are the buzzwords that have been used by totalitarian states in the past to justify and consolidate their power. Be very careful with those buzzwords. He should define what he means. And the King’s totalitarian state -- again I would argue that’s a hypothetical, too. And I don’t think that it’s something he can pull off because of the opposition -- international and domestically. Again that hypothetical is in some ways more hypothetical than Baburam Bhattarai’s desire to set up a new type of democratic state that is not a bourgeois parliamentary system and is anti-feudal and anti-imperialist. He [Bhattarai] has to define his terms.

 
He should concentrate on defining that.  

Very clearly.

 
More definition and clarification is needed from their front.  

All I’ve been trying to say is that they are saying things that look dangerous and that they have to define their terms.

 
But the Maoists are telling that why don’t we go for a constituent assembly which makes people sovereign. Why are you opposed to that idea?  

I have never said that I am opposed to constitutional assembly. I have more recently pointed out that they seem to be setting up a formula where there would be elections to a constitutional assembly where they would put down their weapons for what, a week? Then they get them back, and we’re supposed to believe that the people in the 4,000 villages under those conditions would vote with their conscience, would feel free to vote against the Maoists who are going to come back into their villages with their weapons? I am just again asking them to define their terms and be very explicit. And asking the people of Nepal to listen closely to what they are saying.

 
Bamdev Gautam wrote an article addressing you saying that the moment there is a constituent assembly within minutes either parties will ask or will force the Maoists to lay down their arms or come out the 12-point agreement.  

And again he might know things that I don’t. But if he is saying that they will put them down for a week that’s not enough.

 
Why don’t you give Maoists a chance? I can understand you don’t trust them but why don’t you test them?  

Oh, I would love to test them. I would love to give them a chance, but again it’s hard to imagine giving them a chance while they’re engaging in violence, killing innocent people, and saying that their real plan is to violently overthrow the state. That’s a chance I cannot give them. That’s the chance the people of Nepal should not be willing to give them.

 
Prachanda recently gave an interview to an Indian daily called ‘Hindu’ where he said that and I quote, ‘Despite the fact that we are talking about pushing multiparty democracy, America has decided that our movement and alliance has to be crushed.’ 

Again I point out two things about that. What’s the date of that interview? It was about a week before I gave my speech. The second point I would like to make is that if you turn the page you will see that that’s precisely where he says that our vision of democracy is not a bourgeois parliamentary democracy, it is anti-imperial, anti-feudal. So he is saying, well, we are talking about a multiparty competitive system that’s not really bourgeois political parties running for power, it’s something else. We are going to make sure that we are anti-imperial and anti-feudal by amending the constitution in that fashion. And then he’s saying ‘why doesn’t the U.S. support this formula?’ later in the interview. So I think what the Nepalese should say is that what he is saying is scary. We should not be giving this person a blank check. He needs to define his terms. And the U.S. saying, ‘Wait a second, we have reasons to be concerned here.’ I think that is perfectly legitimate. We are trying to crush it? No, never. We are not giving any lethal security assistance to the RNA. How can you conclude that we are trying to crush them? That’s a strange assertion.

 
“Our movement and alliance.” 

Again, we are saying to the parties: Just look closely at what they are saying. Try to talk to them about this. Get them to define, and if they give you definitions that are not reassuring then you need to be worried.

 
Prachanda has also said in the same interview that now American viewpoint is guided by its strategic point of view in Nepal. Do you have any strategic interest? Or since when you have started having strategic interest here?  

I think he goes on to say that we are using Nepal to encircle China. Is that it? I think that’s the article where he gives that quote too. 

No not in this article I am quoting. 

Then that’s in another one then. 

 
But there are those people, there is a section believing that American policy in Nepal at the moment is guided by certain strategic interests.  

Let me define our strategic interest in Nepal. And if you look at the map it will become clear. We do view China and India as rising powers that we need to work with. My president is going to India in the next couple of weeks. We do worry that instability in Nepal will make things much more difficult for China and India. We do worry specifically that a Maoist takeover would lead to instability in a region that doesn’t need it. So we do have a strategic interest here. What’s the answer to that strategic interest? Frankly it’s a peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Nepal. And so, yeah, we have a strategic interest here, and the strategic interest is to get Nepal back to a functioning democracy that has effectively addressed the Maoist insurgency.

 
Or would you like to use this place as a hub where you can keep an eye to both north and south?  

That’s ridiculous. You know we have so much contact both north and south to say that somehow we can use this as what, a listening post? We are going to encircle China? We are going to encircle India from Nepal?

 
Not encircle. Just as a hub, you know.  

To do what?

 
Just to look around, you know.  

No. Makes no sense. That’s a ludicrous assertion.

 
Talking about the international community, what kind of similarities of views or differences you have in terms of this Maoist insurgency and the current situation in Nepal vis-à-vis India, or the European community for that matter?  

I think there is a huge degree of overlap in our views. We have, particularly since the February 1, worked very closely particularly with the Indians and the British to make sure that our policies were more or less in line. Frankly they have been more in line the whole time. There’s a bottom-line agreement that you need to get this country back to a functioning democracy if you are going to address the insurgency affectively. There’s a bottom-line agreement that the Maoists’ use of violence is very, very dangerous. And I think there’s a bottom-line agreement that if the Maoists’ take over using violence and retaining violence after the current state is overthrown it would be disastrous for Nepal.

 
Some argue that Europeans and Indians are softer towards Maoists than Americans?  

Well you have ask the Indians and the Europeans that. But, again, I think if you put it in those terms -- would they be comfortable with the Maoists taking over this country -- the answer would be a resounding no. Again, I do think that there is agreement on the basic points.

 
How do you think that China is playing its role in the current critical situation in Nepal?  

As an outside observer, [I think] China seems to be playing a constructive role, encouraging the sides to talk to each other, engage in dialogue to resolve the problem. That’s a very positive role.

 
How would you rate Nepal’s foreign policy?  

(Laughing) I am not going to comment on that. No comment.

 
Your comment on just-concluded local elections?  

We came up with a very strong statement because we were disappointed that the elections had not been preceded by any attempts at reconciliation between the palace and the parties.

 
What do you think about the King’s roadmap that’s going on.  

I am not completely clear what his roadmap is so it’s hard for me to comment. I don’t know -- I think his roadmap has to be genuine reconciliation with the parties and a way back to a functioning democracy. I don’t know exactly what his roadmap is, but that’s what it should be in my view. 

Any comments on his latest message? 

I would say it did not close doors, and in that sense may be a possible step forward, but there needs to be whole lot more work and whole lot more spelling out of what his intentions are. 

King’s roadmap says that by next year there’s going to be national elections and by that he’s going to roll back democratic process in Nepal. What’s wrong with that? 

Well, if there’s reconciliation between the palace and parties before that, it’d be great. We’ll welcome that. We’ll try to support them in every way we can. Absent that reconciliation, there’s going to continue to be fears that even those elections would be geared towards consolidating the King’s rule rather than moving the country back towards a functioning democracy.

 
Party leaders in private conversations, they say that among King’s international supporters in the democratic world, America is closer to King. Is that right or wrong?  

No. I think we’ve been pushing the King all along.

 
Are you pushing hard enough?  

Well, see again the assumption is that the King has not [given up power] so this isn’t working. I would argue that that means that you keep up the pressure and you continue to urge reconciliation. I understand that this is a negative consequence of my feeling compelled to point out that the Maoists are still relying on violence. In a twisted sort of way, that becomes an allegation that I am supporting the King. It’s anything but that.

 
How will things continue in Nepal? You have any tip?  

I think I made it clear that you’re not at a stable situation. Things are either going to get a lot better or a lot worse. I don’t have a precise time frame, but I think that it will happen fairly quickly. Again, I have not reached nirvana. I cannot predict ultimate outcomes. But I do worry that unless you do see reconciliation between the King and the parties, the outcomes would be very, very negative.

 
You seem to be very sure that the reconciliation between political parties and the King is the pre-requisite for any positive movements in this country. 

Analytically that’s what I think, but I could be wrong. But again, the actions and words of the Maoists since the end of ceasefire indicate that they are feeling no pressure at all. That they are confident. I talk to people who interviewed Mr. Prachanda. They said that he is looking smart and comfortable, not worried at all, and if I were him I’d be feeling that way too.

 
Maoists have a great capacity in deception.  

They do. Yes they do.

 
So do others.
 
Thank you very much. Arko choti interview garnu paryo bhane purai Nepali ma garula.
 
Huncha. Ma sakesamma koshish garchu.